On September 2, 2018, the Houston Chronicle published “Remember the Villains of Hurricane Harvey” as their lead editorial. The byline was listed simply as “The Editorial Board.” The editorial board is currently composed of the following people (just in case you wondered):
- John McKeon, Publisher.
- Jack Sweeney, Chairman.
- Lisa Falkenberg, Opinion Editor.
- Evan Mintz, Deputy Opinion Editor.
- Jim Newkirk, Outlook Editor.
- Andrea Georgsson, Sunday Outlook Editor.
- Harold Jackson, Editorial Writer.
- Andrea White, Editorial Writer.
STAR WARS meme prepared by m. bloom paraphrasing the lead editorial only slightly.
The editorial called for Houstonians to remember villainous developers “who saw nothing wrong with building neighborhoods inside the flood pools behind Addicks and Barker reservoirs, and then kept the risks to themselves.”
First, some definitions of the word “villain,” to place the editorial in the proper context:
Dictionary.com: Villain: (1) a cruelly malicious person who is involved in or devoted to wickedness or crime; scoundrel; (2) a character in a play, novel, or the like, who constitutes an important evil agency in the plot.
Merriam-Webster: Villain: (1) a character in a story or play who opposes the hero; (2) a deliberate scoundrel or criminal; (3) one blamed for a particular evil or difficulty.
Cambridge: Villain (1) a bad person who harms other people or breaks the law; (2) a cruel or evil character in a book, play, or film.
Let’s break this down one bit at a time.
The developers (and the professional engineers who designed their developments) invested private capital to provide affordable housing on privately-owned land, with an annual risk of flooding of much less than 1%, which is the consensus standard used by all communities in the United States to design and locate new homes and other structures. Engineers designed streets, lights, traffic controls, water systems, wastewater systems, and drainage facilities that functioned perfectly from the day they were built until Harvey arrived.
I believe that the engineers designing these neighborhoods did so in compliance with Sections 137.51 through 137.55 of the rules promulgated by the Texas Board of Professional Engineers under the legal authority of the Texas Engineering Practice Act. These rules require engineers “to safeguard, life, health and property, to promote the public welfare” as well as “to protect the health, safety, property, and welfare of the public.” Please note that this rule does not require engineers to design neighborhoods with zero risk of flooding.
Why do I believe that the developers and engineers acted ethically and appropriately? Simply because the health, safety, property, and welfare of the residents were safeguarded.
Because the potable water provided to the residents was clean and healthy every day until Harvey arrived. Ever try to raise a family without potable water?
Because sanitary wastewater was collected from every home, treated, and properly discharged into nearby bayous every day until Harvey arrived. Ever try to live in a home without a toilet or proper wastewater facilities?
Because none of the homes fell down on their owners every day until Harvey arrived and even during Harvey.
Because the roads carried traffic every day until Harvey arrived. What if there were no roads? Because the traffic lights and street lights worked every day until Harvey arrived. What if there were no lights?
Because rainwater from storm after storm was carried downstream from the developments without flooding anyone every day until Harvey arrived. Because the systems worked.
All of these critical public health, safety, and welfare facilities were designed by ethical engineers with private funding from developers. All of the facilities and homes were made possible by the developers who invested private capital to create desirable places for people to live with a low and acceptable level of risk.
We’ve already decided to push our inundation risk exposure down for new construction in the City of Houston and Harris County to significantly less than 0.2% per year. Note that a finished floor elevation placed 2 feet higher than the 500-year flood elevation has an annual chance of inundation of much less than 0.2% per year in most places in this region.
But, if we collectively wish to retrofit existing homes and businesses in our region that are exposed to higher annual risk levels than 0.2% or 1% (think Hunting, White Oak, Brays – but certainly not neighborhoods in the Addicks or Barker flood pools) we need to have an open conversation about the desired risk level, the costs to achieve it, and the benefits realized.
We should avoid villainizing folks that built communities and facilities that worked and that beat the desired risk levels established at the time those facilities were built.
The villains pictured below are not developers.
A still from the silent comedy, Barney Oldfield’s Race for a Life MACK SENNETT/PUBLIC DOMAIN
Michael
What kind of defense is this? It worked until it didn’t? I am afraid that doesnt quite cut it. And you say these were built to the risk level established at the time? Then what of Mr Charles Glen Crocker, a professional engineer who raised a red flag? The quashing of his information was less than honorable. TC&B said the information could unnecessarily adversely impact sales of lands. That kind of motivation does indeed rise to the level of villainous. Croker’s information was not taken seriously–and it should have been!
This is a disappointing piece, Michael!
John:
Thanks for reading my blog and for taking the time to comment.
The post is about acceptable risk vs. unacceptable risks. Nothing humans do is without some risk. The homes along Hunting or Brays have a higher risk of flooding than the homes in the flood pools. That is obvious.
Mr. Crocker, according to the Houston Chronicle article published on January 20, 2018, identified that the federal government did not own all of the land that would be inundated if water filled up to the spillway elevation. His letter did not, however, examine the risk of that happening.
Mr. Crocker noted that homes in the flood pools could flood, merely because of the elevation differences between their finished floors and the top of the levee. The article is not clear about whether Mr. Crocker indicated in his letter what he thought the risk was. The response from TC&B suggests he omitted any discussion of risk or perhaps even exaggerated the risk.
The information he released was not quashed. It was discussed and people got angry because he was suggesting homes with a less than 1% annual chance of flooding in the flood pool were somehow more dangerous than homes elsewhere in the region with a higher than 1% annual chance of flooding.
It is like saying to one driver going 100 mph without their seatbelt on: “Have a great trip!” while at the same time saying to another driver going 30 mph with their seatbelt on near a highrise building construction site: “Oh my god, watch out! You might get hit by a failing brick!”
TC&B suggested that home sales might decline because the Crocker letter implied (perhaps) that the risk was higher than 1%. If I was in Houston when his letter came out, I would have noted the same thing.
Lastly, unlike what you state in your comment, Mr. Crocker was never a licensed professional engineer, according to the Houston Chronicle article.
Your comment has inspired me to consider in a future blog post this question: “What level of risk exposure must be exceeded to trigger a warning or a notification to the user or purchaser or consumer of any product or service, provided by a private or public entity?”
For example, if you buy one ski-lift ticket, should you be provided with a risk disclosure statement by the ski resort?
What if you buy a home at the top of a “T” intersection? Does the developer, engineer, and city have to provide you with a risk disclosure statement about the chance that someone will drive into your living room?
Interesting stuff to ponder in this risky world we live in….
To the person who left a comment without providing their full real name, please add that. If you add that information I would be happy to approve the comment so it appears on this post.
Hey Michael–took me a bit to find this!
One of the points of this whole story has to be the need for some humility. Clearly some serious errors were made. Were the errors nefarious? I believe the error to put people in harms way was nefarious to some degree for some people. Very clearly a warning flag was raised–perhaps an assessment of risk was lacking, but the warning was raised nonetheless. I dont believe the information was pursued as it should have been. The HC article implies that Crocker was given the brush off and treated rather badly.
And why was this particular spot of land (within the flood pool) so necessary to develop? There were plenty of other places.
So should people be advised of the risk? Absolutely. It is not necessary that the assessment of risk be overly precise, but if there is significant risk, people should be informed. If you live in a levee protection district–you should be informed! Where ever areas were flooded by Harvey, Ike etc–there should be staff gauges indicating the depth. Now, there are still people buying houses in crazy places–fully informed. It is their choice to take that risk. But of course they should pay the full cost of that decision and not ask us to subsidize their flood insurance as we are doing today.
We need to understand the lay of the land. Some places flood way more than others. We have that data and it should be shared widely. As you say, there is always some risk. But we can at least point out the relative risk–e.g., this place flood more than that place. And we do have to recognize that we dont always know as much as we should.
If engineers make an attempt to portray risk, even behind levees, then I think you have done your due diligence. That unfortunately has not been the SOP as much as it should have been.
Conversation is good!